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ELEMENTS FOR A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF THE ARAB
REVOLUTIONS IN SPRING 2011*
KARIN KNEISSL
Nothing is as powerful as an idea whose time has come
Victot Hugo 
Introduction
These revolts were not masterminded by any opposition force. They were popular uprisings without 
charismatic leadership, partly enhanced by social network communication, but not a Facebook 
revolution. Will the changes made by the young generation in the Arab countries inspire other 
young people without perspectives in Europe and beyond? Developments in Spain and Greece 
indicate such a development. Will good governance follow decades of authoritarian regimes in the 
22 member-states of the Arab League? Or will neo-absolutism in secular or religious form prevail? 
Any debate in spring 2011 provides us with more questions than clear responses.
However, one fact is undeniable: the Arab world has awakened from a long coma-sleep; another 
century of stagnation seems to be over. Its impact on other regions can be felt. Civil servants in 
the US-state of Wisconsin who protested in late February against cuts in their payments shouted 
slogans like “We are all Egyptians”. The Chinese censorship blocks the notion “jasmine”, trying 
to avert any potential spill-over of the virus of the Jasmine revolution which started in Tunisia on 
December 17, 2010. 
The market police in a small provincial town in southern Tunisia humiliated Mohammed Boueizi, 
a 25-year-old graduate, who tried to survive by selling fruits. He had rejected to pay the required 
“baksheesh”, the tip to the police. His cart was destroyed. Not knowing anymore how to earn a 
living for his family, he immolated himself. 12 days later he died from his injuries. That act of 
despair triggered oﬀ  protests by thousands of Tunisians who spread the message and their comments 
through social media networks across the country. Soon citizens of all layers of society went into 
the streets. A revolution had started, not a mere revolt. At stake are political demands not just high 
food-prices. Notions like dignity and justice dominate the demonstrations from Morocco to Iraq. 
People of all backgrounds are on the move. This article tries to assess several scientifi c aspects 
of the current revolutions in the Arab world. The author who lectures regularly at universities in 
Lebanon and in Central Asia will analyse the historical background, main factors and potential 
implications for the Arab regimes and beyond.
The following aspects will be discussed in this working-paper: 
• Why did the revolutions start now?
• Which historic references may serve as a comparative analysis ‒ 1789, 1848, 1968 or/and 1989?
• What is the nature of the current revolutions
• The reasons for stagnation in the Arab world
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• The fundamental diﬀ erences between the various Arab societies and their common features
• The role of the media: the Arab satellite channel Al-Jazeera and social networks
• The virus of the Jasmine revolution spreading globally
• Reactions by the West: oscillating between passive surprise, humanitarian intervention
      and cheque-diplomacy
• A prudent outlook: from interim governments to new governance in the midst of
     global economic distress
1. Setting the revolutions in a larger historic frame-work
The notion of time diﬀ ers profoundly between East and West. During my early days of Arabic studies 
I was intrigued by the absence of the future tense, which is expressed by a mere prefi x used rarely in 
written classical Arabic. Time is calculated more in terms of generations than in the guise of quarterly 
reports, as is the case in the Occident. I recall a conversation with a Damascene shopkeeper in the 
mid-1980s. Speaking of the economic situation he said: ”Currently life is not easy, this might still be 
the case when my son takes over, but maybe during the life-time of the son of my son, things will 
change for better.” That long-term thinking taught me a lot about the long breath Oriental people have.
1.1. Looking back to the An-Nahda movement of the early 1900s and today’s potential for a secular 
political movement
The Arab world awakening is not a new phenomenon, though scale and global impact, such as 
the new price-hikes in the oil-market due to geopolitical risk premium in the futures’ market, is 
unprecedented. But it was in the late 19th and early 20th century that political salons mushroomed 
from Casablanca to Alexandria. Young men who had studied in Paris or Heidelberg returned to 
their homes and spread the idea of nationalism. That trend was called the An-Nahda movement for 
it amounted to an Arab renaissance, a real awakening as the Arab word signifi es. The book written 
in 1938 by the Lebanese author Georges Antonius carries the very title; it turned into a classic 
textbook for students of Arab nationalism.1  
The roots are manifold and complex. However, one major momentum for the emergence of Arab 
nationalism in opposing the then ruling Ottoman Empire was the renewal of the Arab language. 
The once pure classical Arabic had degenerated into dozens of dialects; teaching of high-level 
Arabic, mosques apart, was rare. The omnipresent administrative language was Osmanli. It 
was the linguistic work of the Boustany Brothers in Beirut and other authors of dictionaries and 
encyclopaedias, which contributed massively to the rise of the An-Nahda movement. The reform 
of the language as the pre-condition of all thinking was essential; the importance of the language 
holds true for all forms of political mobilisation.
Interestingly enough, many political activists in the Arab Nationalist movements of republican 
nature were Christians and not Muslims. The concept of a secular movement of Pan Arabism as 
opposed to an Islamic legitimisation of the autocratic ruler was convincing for Non-Muslims who 
felt marginalised in the Ottoman Empire. Their status of dhimmi, which literally means protected 
member of a religious minority, put them into diﬀ erent fi scal and legal categories.2 The sultan, 
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1 Antonius, George. 1938. The Arab Awakening. London: Hamish Hamilton.
2 The Ottoman Empire continued the Byzantine system of autonomy in the guise of the millet system, which 
granted a large degree of self-rule to the religious and ethnic minorities. It should not be judged merely from 
the perspective of discrimination. On the contrary, in spite of all corruption within the Ottoman administration 
the religious autonomy enabled inter-ethnic coexistence within a multi-national empire.
a political leader, who was at the same time the Caliph, the religious authority within the Sunni 
world, ruled all subjects of the Ottoman Empire.3 The concept of a secular ideology such as Arab 
Nationalism shifted the political patterns fundamentally: it inspired young highly educated Arabs 
and contributed to the internal demise of the Ottoman rule in the Arab regions.
 In parallel, the movement for a United Arab Kingdom emerged. The Arab Revolt oﬃ  cially started 
in 1915 as a unifi ed military campaign of Arab tribes of the Hejaz to oust the Ottomans. The British 
Empire equipped her allies with weapons and logistics. The Hashemite tribe as the guardians of 
the holy sites of Islam in Mecca and Medina was initially leading the Arab Revolt, but the new 
order established after World War I diﬀ ered profoundly from the British promises made to the 
Hashemites. As compensation the Hashemite princes got a desert kingdom in Transjordan, the 
Eastern part of the original mandate of Palestine and the throne of Iraq. The Saud tribe replaced 
the Hashemites in the Peninsula, supported by Britain and later the USA, thereby contributing to 
the rise of extreme Wahabite Islam.4 The ruler Abdel Aziz ibn Saud established Saudi-Arabia as 
the outcome of a jihad in 1932. The Hussein-McMahon correspondence is a detailed description of 
the British promises and commitments to such an independent Empire while urban young élites far 
away from the Arab desert plain in the Hedjaz strived for republican models based on separation 
of powers in the spirit of Montesquieu.5 
What happened is well known. None of those Arab dreams materialised. British and French decision-
makers had other plans for the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. The secret correspondence between 
Mark Sykes in London and his French counterpart Georges Picot in 1915 resulted in a tentative 
reshuﬄ  ing of the map of the Middle East, notably Turkey, Mesopotamia, the Levant including Syria, 
Lebanon and Palestine. However, it was not the so-called Sykes-Picot Agreement, which shaped 
the territory. It became public during the Russian Revolution when its copy was found in the Tsarist 
Archives in St.Petersburg shocking both the Arab Nationalists, the Hashemite leaders of the armed 
revolt and the Zionist movement. All had been promised diﬀ erent plans by the British government. 
The territorial arrangement according to the Franco-British zones of infl uence foresaw spheres 
of direct and indirect control by the respective colonial power. It was diﬀ erent from the ultimate 
delimitation of borders, which are still valid. It was in April 1920 in the Italian sea-resort San Remo 
where British and French negotiators, primarily from the oil industry, determined the tracing of a 
pipeline from British controlled Northern Mesopotamia through French controlled Syria to the port 
of Haifa in the British Mandate Palestine. The increasingly strategic importance of oil in warfare had 
resulted in the emergence of oil diplomacy. Actually, the oil-companies inspired the tracing of the 
future borders between Iraq and its north-western neighbours. Iraq was created along pipelines and it 
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3 Sulta means in Arab worldly power, while Caliph is originally the successor, thereby following Prophet Mo-
hammed. Since the beginning of the revelation of Islam the Prophet proved to be both a religious authority and 
a political leader. Personal union has accompanied the making o the Islamic and Arabic Empire. Separating 
politics and religion has often proved complex because of that historic union.
4 See inter alia: T.E. Lawrence. 2002. The Seven Pillars of Wisdom; fi rst privately printed in 1926; and Reinhard 
Schulze, Geschichte der islamischen Welt im 20. Jahrhundert, München: C.H.Beck, 216ff.
5 Those “betrayals” led to a profound disillusion by the Arabs with Europe. Shortly after World War I, the King 
Crane Commission dispatched by US-President Woodrow Wilson did surveys on possible options for trusteeships 
in the region. The USA would have been welcome by the Arabs who considered the US-government as much 
more trustworthy than the Europeans, who were geographically so close and pursued their colonial aspirations 
in the southern and eastern Mediterranean. Various authors dwelled on that chapter from different perspectives. 
An Arab perspective can be found in Hourani, A. 1993. A History of the Arab Peoples. London: Faber; an Anglo-
Saxon view is contained in Hudson, M.C. 1977. Arab Politics – The Search for Legitimacy. Yale University.
could probably also implode along new production-sharing agreements subsequent to the intervention 
by the US and her allies in March 2003.6 The importance of commodities like oil and natural gas 
should be taken into consideration in all deliberations about external interests in the region. 
Pan Arabism as an ideology was institutionalised with the Arab League in 1945. The authority 
of that regional organisation declined dramatically; it proved unable in handling the Palestinian 
Question and many inter-Arab confl icts. Nevertheless, with the arrival of the Egyptian president 
Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952 the spirit of Pan Arabism reached its climax. Nasserism became the 
synonym for Arab nationalism. The defeat of the Arab armies in the Six Day War in June 1967 was 
the defi nite end of secular ideologies. The massive humiliation by the victorious Israeli army was 
another naksa (disaster in Arabic) after the establishment of the Jewish State in May 1948. Given 
the impotence of Arab nationalism a rising number of Arabs turned to political Islam. The Muslim 
Brothers, founded in 1928 by Hassan el-Banna in Egypt initiated its oﬀ spring among Palestinians, 
later known as the Hamas movement. The Israeli occupation authorities promoted Hamas until 
1978. Israel preferred young Palestinians to pray in new mosques than to join the leftist PLO.
There followed decades of stagnation in the Arab world, dominated by the unsolved Palestinian 
question, a series of wars in the region within and between Arab states and foreign interventions. 
Even during the 1990s when a fresh breeze provoked a shift of political patterns on a global scale, 
the Arab world looked immune to any changes. The fi rst Arab Development Report by the United 
Nations Development Programme UNDP in 2002 investigated into the reasons for that stalemate. 
Their conclusions read as follows: absence of freedom and the exclusion of half of the population 
from public life, i.e. the female population. The authors, the majority of them Arab intellectuals, 
were very clear in their diagnosis.
“There is a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions in terms of participatory 
governance. The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most of Latin America 
and in East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and much of Central Asia in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s has barely reached the Arab States. This freedom defi cit undermines human 
development and is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development. 
While de jure acceptance of democracy and human rights is enshrined in constitutions, legal 
codes and government pronouncements, de facto implementations is often neglected and, in 
some cases deliberately disregarded. In most cases, the governance pattern is characterised by 
a powerful executive branch of the state, being in some cases free from institutional checks and 
balances. Representative democracy is not always genuine and sometimes absent. Freedoms 
of expression and association are frequently curtailed. Obsolete norms of legitimacy prevail”.7  
The report gave an honest and gloomy picture of gender inequality in the Arab countries, 
highlighting the absence of women in public life. Occupation in Iraq and Palestine were dealt with 
specifi cally in the UNDP report of 2004. Revising the Arab Human Development one can study 
the indicators announcing turmoil for demographic reasons and frustration of a highly educated 
young generation facing political and economic limits on all fronts.
The fact that no other generation of young Arabs has been as large as today can be illustrated by 
some statistics from the 2009 Arab Human Development Report:
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6 The author argues this thesis in Kneissl, K. 2008. Der Energiepoker. Munich: Finanz Buch Verlag.
7 Arab Human Development Report 2002 by the UNDP, p.21; see: http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/
other/ahdr/ahdr2002e.pdf.
“(...) the Arab countries will be home to some 395 million people by 2014 (compared to about 
317 million in 2007, and 150 million in 1980). In a region where water and arable land are 
shrinking, population growth at these rates while falling, will still put intense pressures on the 
carrying capacity of Arab countries’ lands and further threaten environmental sustainability.” 
(...) the most evident and challenging aspect of the region’s demographic profi le is its “youth 
bulge”. Young people are the fastest growing segment of the Arab countries’ populations. Some 
60 percent of the population is under 25 years old, making this one of the most youthful regions 
in the world, with a median age of 22 years compared to a global average of 28.”8 
1.2. Why now?
Those demographic and socio-economic trends pointed towards a mounting crisis or even to 
social explosion. However, nobody could foretell an exact date. But the fact that an uprising of a 
discontented youth would happen one day was evident. Teaching in several Arab countries gives 
me opportunities to listen to young colleagues. The issue at stake is always fi nding an adequate 
employment and dreaming of travelling or even defi nite migration.9 However, visa and travel 
restrictions turn all projects into a distant dream. I may quote an Algerian colleague who teaches 
literature in Oran: “When I wrote my thesis in the late 1970s, it was possible to travel to France 
and do my research for a year. None of my students today has ever left Algeria.” Those constraints 
to freedom of movement contribute vehemently to the overall frustration.
Eventually, the Arab world might have seen popular democratic uprisings earlier, if the Iraq war 
had not come in between in early 2003. This view is voiced by Volker Perthes, director of the 
Berlin based Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik.10 And I do support this assessment, since the 
notion of democracy has been connoted with interventionism, instability and anarchy ever since 
the invasion into Iraq for the sake of regime-change started. 
Furthermore, the strongmen in charge, in particular the former President of Egypt Hosni Mubarak, 
cultivated very well the paradigm of “Either the Islamists or me”. That menace contributed, inter 
alia, to the unconditional support of Western governments, which feared chaos in a post-Mubarak 
Egypt. Alliances of European governments with the autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Libya were 
considered as guarantees against illegal migration. In 2008, the governments of Italy and Libya 
ratifi ed a bilateral agreement to control migration, which stipulated Italian fi nancial aid for large 
camps where migrants from Sub-Sahara African countries were held in rather inhumane conditions.11 
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8 See Arab Human Development Report of 2009, p. 19 and 20 at: http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/
ahdr/ahdr2009e.pdf.
9 Literature and fi lms on that subject are abundant. I may quote the following documentary, which illustrates 
the topic perfectly well: Messages from Paradise #1 by Daniela Swarovsky and Samuli Schielke.
10 See radio interview on ORF Ö1 on February 12, 2011 (http://oe1.orf.at/artikel/269438).
11 On 30 August 2008, Italy and Libya signed a friendship, partnership and co-operation treaty for the pur-
pose of developing a “special and privileged” bilateral relationship involving a strong and wide-ranging 
partnership in political, economic and other fi elds. Article 19 deals with the “intensifying” of co-operation 
in “fi ghting terrorism, organised crime, drug traffi cking and illegal immigration”, in accordance with the 
agreement signed in Rome in December 2000, and subsequent understandings, including co-operation pro-
tocols signed in Tripoli on 29 December 2007. The two parties also agree to set up a border control system 
for Libyan land borders (50% funded by Italy and 50% of the funding sought from the EU on the basis of 
unspecifi ed understandings reached between Libya and the European Commission “in the past”). For more 
details see: Trattato di amicizia, partnerariato e cooperazione tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Grande Giamar-
iria Araba Libica Popolare Socialista, 30.8.2008 (in Italian). The Libyan authorities opened up those camps 
Similar arrangements had been concluded with the former Tunisian government of President Ben-
Ali.12  
The West’s preference for these autocratic regimes found its legal and political basis in those 
bilateral agreements and partly also in the EU association agreements. The EU-Tunisia association 
agreement was regularly cited as a model for market economy and dialogue.13 Apparently, oﬃ  cials 
in the European Commission or diplomats of the EU-27 serving in Tunisia did not seize the degree 
of corruption in Tunisia, where the vast majority of public tenders as well as construction contracts, 
licences etc in the private sector were shared within the family of the President, respectively his 
wife’s clan, the Trabelsi family.
In addition to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Euromed, also known as the Barcelona process 
of 1995, a Mediterranean Union was initiated by the French EU-presidency in May 2008. The 
essence of that parallel structure was a relaunch for a multilateral partnership that encompasses 
43 countries from Europe and the Mediterranean Basin: the 27 member states of the EU and 16 
Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans. During his 
electoral campaign, Nicholas Sarkozy said that the Mediterranean Union would be modelled on the 
European Union with a shared judicial area and common institutions. Furthermore, he saw Turkish 
membership of the Mediterranean Union as an alternative to membership of the European Union.14 
The fi rst secretary-general of that very Union, Ahmed Masadeh, quitted his post on January 26, 2011 
stating, that “the general conditions against which he accepted to assume the job have changed”.15 
“States follow interests, not principles” is the shorthand for realpolitik, which also applies to the 
double standards practised regarding Arab governments. Whether it is the topic of migration 
control or energy-interdependence, the bilateral relations between European and North African 
respectively Middle Eastern governments have been determined by those constraints. The special 
case of Libya, where a military intervention was launched on the basis of the UN-Security Council 
resolution 1973 on March 19, 2011 will be briefl y highlighted. The following should be borne in 
mind: in addition to the internal problems in the Arab world, the many unholy alliances between 
European governments and autocratic regimes have contributed to the paralysis in the Arab world. 
The status quo was preferred to any change.
However, gradually change had been creeping into the Arab societies. Globalisation started to 
conquer the Middle East and North Africa subtly. One of the engines for transformation was 
the Qatar-based Arab satellite TV-channel Al-Jazeera in November 1996 following the closure 
of the BBC’s Arabic language TV bought by Saudis and suppressed. The new channel broke 
- 6 -
in response to the intervention based on UN-Security Council resolution 1973 in March 2011. That prompted 
an enormous increase in the fl ow of migrants from Libya to southern Italy. In early May, approximately 600 
refugees died when crossing the straits in the Mediterranean in one night.
12 See the agreement of 2009, summarised at http://www.tunisia.com/news/tunisia-france-two-agreements-
immigration-signed-between-aneti-and-ofi i: “The Tunisian minister affi rmed that Tunisia is the only coun-
try in the region to have signed with France an agreement on joint management of migration fl ows and co-
development, signed in April 2008, adding that the agreement is considered by many observers as a model 
insofar as it affects all aspects of management of migratory fl ows (illegal migration, migration of seasonal 
and permanent workers and contribution to development of skills and human resources in Tunisia).”
13 See the now abbreviated version on the website of the European External Action Service: http://www.eeas.
europa.eu/tunisia/association_agreement/index_en.htm.
14 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_for_the_Mediterranean.
15 http://mideastenvironment.apps01.yorku.ca/?p=1844 visited on March 15, 2011.
the monopoly of state-controlled media, which reduced itself to reports from the court, be it 
monarchical or republican. Debates started, broadcasting dissenting views and talk-shows created 
huge controversies in the Arab states.
Al-Jazeera’s in depth coverage of the Arab revolutions, in particular the 18-day-revolution in Egypt 
with a rather simple one perspective camera from Tahrir Square, gave an essential momentum 
to the dynamics of the Arab spring movements. It was Al-Jazeera that reported on the riots in 
Tunisia in early January 2011, when no other TV-station was there. Without the coverage by a 
large TV-station the Jasmine revolution might not have gained the same momentum. The English 
programme of Al-Jazeera started in 2006, the programme and staﬀ  are diﬀ erent from the Arab 
station. That channel served as primary source of information in the West.16  
With classical Arabic in decline given the mediocrity in many universities, and among the political 
class, in particular in Egypt, once the intellectual centre, the Arabic programme of Al-Jazeera 
has been contributing to the renewal of the language. What had been a sort of monopoly of the 
Islamist movements, namely the correct use of classical Arabic in all discourse, was now promoted 
in a secular and neutral fashion. Given the enormous reception of Al-Jazeera throughout the Arab 
world that TV channel contributes to a new sense of secular Pan Arabism. Certainly, it would be 
unwise to push analogies in extremis and pretend a replay of Pan Arab ideas of late 19th century. 
Nevertheless, the essential nexus for Arabs belonging to one culture in spite of all ethnic and social 
diﬀ erences is the bond of a common language. Improving its quality fosters political thinking. 
Citizens knew how to learn fresh political thinking opposing the repression by the regime. Access 
to satellite TV and Internet defi nitely enhanced this process.
When the whistleblower platform Wikileaks exposed corruption in Tunisia it confi rmed public 
distrust.17 The out of control food infl ation accelerated discontent, which sparked the fi rst food and 
anti-corruption riots. The amplifi cation of riots by mobile telephones, blogs, Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube, and rapid evolution of self-assembling dynamic networks in streets enabled in digital 
space, large-scale mass protests erupt in capital overwhelming fears of government reprisal. 
Still it would be a simplifi ed and ultimately wrong analysis to call the revolutions in the Arab world 
the fi rst Facebook revolution as many editors in the US-media quickly termed it. Not only has the 
Belarus born blogger Evgeny Morozov denied the democratisation aspect of the Internet.18 So did 
many activists involved in the demonstrations. The popular revolution in Egypt started in a massive 
way once the authorities blocked the Internet. People left the Internet café, their PC at home and 
went into the streets. Instead of chatting behind an anonymous name they overcame all inherited 
fears and crossed old taboos.
Education, religion, social values and family rules are based on the paradigm of resigning oneself 
to God’s will. “Kul maktoub”, all is written in the book of destiny, is the often-heard advice. It is 
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16 See the author’s contribution on the role of Al-Jazeera at the symposium by the Renner Institute on the Arab 
Spring, Vienna March 24, 2011.
17 The release of diplomatic cables by US-missions by Wikileaks in early December 2010 might have contri-
buted to the Arab uprising from another perspective: thanks to Wikileaks it became public what had been 
whispered before in the Arab world, namely the close cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel and the 
Saudi strong request for a US-attack on Iran.
18 Morozov doubts the Internet’s ability to provoke change in authoritarian regimes, believing it is also a pow-
erful conduit for authoritarian and nationalist ideas. See Morozov, Evgeny. 2011. The Net Delusion – the dark 
sides of the internet freedom. New York: Perseus Group.
not up to the individual to change destiny. What happened in that very Arab spring is the surprise, 
that hundreds of thousands of young Arabs overcame that very dictum and rose up against fatalist 
structures.
2. The nature of the revolutions
It is a revolution by the young people against their geriatric political leadership, as far as North 
Africa and the Arabian Peninsula are concerned.19 Even outgoing President Mubarak fi nally 
understood that challenge when he addressed the youth in his clumsy speech on February 11 still 
intending to cling to power.
The young Egyptians and Tunisians are eager to save their revolutions; they fear that the survivors 
of the ancient regime might kidnap it. They aspire nothing less than an end to corruption, a just life 
in dignity and adequate employment.
2.1. What are the political demands of the revolutionaries?
Three key-notions can be captured in all sit-ins, demonstrations and bloggs: al-karama (dignity), 
al-‘adl (justice) and al- ihtaj (frustration) with the political establishment. Hurriya (freedom) was 
the overriding slogan.
The notion of democracy was heard less. Democracy and love are probably the two most abused 
terms. Interventions in the name of regime change, like in Iraq and Afghanistan had contributed 
to a negative connotation of the word democracy in the Arab world. After World War I, Arab 
societies had been denied independence under the pretext that their peoples were not ready and 
had to be guided by the Mandatory powers of Britain and France. Democracy can be interpreted 
in so diﬀ erent ways that the many versions may resemble each other very little. Elections as such 
are neither the remedy to autocracy nor the guarantee for a smooth transformation of societies in a 
post-revolutionary environment. 
The principle of majority voting fi ts probably the Anglo-Saxon world used to a fairly successful 
tradition of two-party system. However, Central and Southern Europe with its historic tradition 
of autochthonous minorities have opted for diﬀ erent voting mechanisms, granting smaller parties 
also access to power in coalition governments.
The fact that there is no single universal model for running a state and a society has been amply 
analysed by the French philosopher Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. His book 
“L’esprit des lois” (Geneva 1748) is not only the basis for a clear separation of powers between the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches20 (rather inexistent within the Westminster model). It also 
demonstrates the many diﬀ erences among climates and peoples and their diﬀ erent political needs. 
His studies have largely contributed to the emergence of anthropology. Actually, Montesquieu’s 
political anthropology gave rise to his theories on government.21  
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19 The leadership in Syria and Jordan is held by men of a younger generation. However, they are as well contested 
for bad governance and corruption. President Bashar al-Assad and King Abdullah are clinging to their power, but 
they both lack the authority and political instinct their respective fathers Hafe al-Assad and King Hussein had.
20 His writings infl uenced James Madison, the “father” of the US-constitution. Montesquieu’s philosophy that “gov-
ernment should be set up so that no man need be afraid of another” reminded Madison and others that a free and 
stable foundation for their new national government required a clearly defi ned and balanced separation of powers.
21 Actually Montesquieu’s elaborations on climate and political system continue in certain aspects the studies of 
the Arab scientist Ibn Khaldun, considered as one of the fi rst sociologists. The latter’s main opus being “Al-
Muqqadimah” (the Introduction).
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Nation building in the recent past has not always been crowned with success. Concepts, actors 
and circumstances may diﬀ er between those who are mandated to do nation building and those 
who are subject to it. Iraqis followed the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia via the TV screen and 
asked themselves with a sense of culpability why they had not been able to rid their country of a 
despot, but had to go through all the consequences of foreign intervention. Regularly, Iraqis are 
now descending into the street on Fridays, the day-oﬀ  in Islamic countries, for a “day of penitence”. 
Those Friday demonstrations carry the name “day of anger” in the other Arab countries.
The British orientalist Bernard Lewis confi rms the diﬀ erence of language and the meaning of 
freedom, which does not have a precise equivalent in Arabic. “Liberty, freedom, it means not being a 
slave. Freedom was a legal term and a social term – it was not a political term. And it was not used as 
a metaphor for political status. The closest Arabic word to our concept of liberty is “justice,” or ‘adl. 
In the Muslim tradition, justice is the standard of good government.”22 The importance of justice 
can be retrieved in a large number of political speeches, stretching from PLO-chairman Yassir 
Arafat (“just and comprehensive solution for Palestine”) to documents of Arab League meetings.
It should also be borne in mind that all Islamic tradition of governance is based on the concept 
of permanent consultation. The Ottoman diwan, the Sultan’s advisory board of ministers, 
circumscribes the procedure. The Arabic term reads ijtima’a, which means both gathering and 
discussing a topic until all parties involved might have agreed. One only has to enter the residence 
of an Oriental dignitary, religious or political, a Christian or Muslim leader, and watch the number 
of chairs. This is part of hospitality and part of bringing together many opinions. Lewis likes to 
quote a diplomatic document of late 18th century which reads as follows: The French government 
was frustrated by how long the ambassador was taking to move ahead with some negotiations. So 
he pushed back: “Here, it is not like it is in France, where the king is sole master and does as he 
pleases. Here, the sultan has to consult.”23 The Palestinian writer and editor Rami Khoury likes 
to point out that Arab tradition might be the forerunner of the culture of seeking consensus in 
international organisations.24 
British Westminster democracy operates along diametrically opposed criteria. And it can be 
mentioned, that the oﬃ  ce of a Westminster prime minister is often considered as being too 
powerful, for it is the Prime Minister who determines when “consensus” is reached in cabinet. A 
cabinet member may be forced to resign simply for opposing one aspect of a government’s agenda, 
even though they agreed with the majority of other proposals.25  
The massive strengthening of the state by the various despots in the Middle East and North-Africa 
following the independence of their respective nation-states has actually contributed to the loss 
of old traditional virtues of good governance which can be found in earlier ages. The society 
was marginalised while the executive became omnipresent with its numerous security and secret 
services harassing the population and mutually controlling each other. The Syrian Assad régimes 
illustrate this dilemma well.
The socio-economic situation is also on the agenda of the young revolutionaries and all the other 
groups which later joined them. The Arab countries suﬀ er from very high unemployment rates, the 
22 Interview in the Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2011. P. A13 “The Tryannies are doomed”.
23 See Lewis, Bernard. 2002. The Mosaic of Worlds. London.
24 Interview with Ramy Khoury, editor in chief of the Lebanese paper Daily Star in November 2005 in Beirut.
25 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westminster_democracy#Criticisms.
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reasons of which have been discussed in the fi ve Arab Human Development reports of the UNDP. 
Not being “connected” to infl uential circles may constrain all eﬀ orts of a young graduate to have 
access to the employment market. Being promoted by a senior oﬃ  cial within the establishment, 
the so-called wasta, is essential for fi nding a work-place, an apartment, obtaining a contract for 
the company etc. Furthermore, food prices had been constantly on the rise due to the sharp price 
hikes of commodities. Just as high price levels for wheat and rice had prompted food riots in many 
countries in early 2008, the risk was back now three years later. 
On the overall level, the revolutions did not and do not carry anti-western slogans. The surprise 
within the surprise of the mass uprising within Arab societies was the enormous potential of 
secularism. Against all odds, an increasing number of Arabs seem to reject the simplistic slogan 
of the Islamist movements, that “Islam is the solution”. The Muslim Brotherhood, though outlawed 
in Egypt since the assassination of President Anwar as-Sadat (a fervent member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s), has been gaining ground. Their (independent) candidates 
had been elected both into Parliament, municipal councils and into unions. Their charity and 
educational organisations had been gradually marginalising the rather ineﬃ  cient public clinics 
and schools. The entire face of the public space in Egypt has changed from unveiled women in 
skirts and men in suits to a majority of veiled women and bearded men in traditional clothes. This 
societal change can also be observed in countries like Syria and Jordan over the past decades.
However, in spite of all their alertness the Islamists were taken by surprise to the same extent, 
as were intelligence services on all sides. The new popular opposition was made up of shaved 
young men; the conservative forces watched with disbelief the mobilisation. With discretion and 
an impressive delay they jumped on the bandwagon of the new revolutionary movement.
The fact that for the time being no Islamic revolution is taking place has to do with the disenchantment 
of young Arabs with the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as with other Islamist experiments in 
the Gaza strip or the schizophrenic world inside Wahhabi Saudi-Arabia. Young Palestinians had 
launched via blogs an initiative on expressing their frustration with all the social constraints put up 
by the Islamic rules of Hamas in Gaza. 
The appeal of political Islam has indeed decreased, as the French academic Oliver Roy had already 
analysed in the early 1990s.26 For nearly two decades that analysis was highly contested since it was 
contrary to the new paradigm of the international threat brought about by Islamism. Roy’s thesis 
is the anti-thesis of the concept of a clash of civilisations. That very notion titled an article by the 
US-political scientist Samuel Huntington in Foreign Aﬀ airs in summer 1993.27 And it dominated 
all political analysis of the Middle East during the past 20 years, in particular once again after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. But a generation of Arab baby-boomers who has grown up with 
Islamism being part of the political landscape has certainly opted against Islam as the solution to 
their problems.
The youth of Iran had started its own massive uprising in June 2009 subsequent to the presidential 
elections and amid fraud allegations. Weeks of civil unrest and mass demonstrations followed, 
they were all brutally repressed by the military and the security services. Twitter and YouTube 
videos played an essential role as means of communication within Iran and with the outside world. 
26 Roy, Olivier. 1992. L’échec de l’Islam politique. Paris: Seuil.
27 It may be pointed out in this context: while the title of the 24 page article still carried a question-mark, the book 
in 1996 simply read “Clash of civilization and the re-making of the world order.”
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However, the authorities quickly retraced all those who twittered via their mobile phones. It was 
not a twitter revolution in contrast to what some analysts pretended then. It was also not the fi rst 
time that the Iranian youth had risen up against the establishment. In December 2000 and once 
again in 2002, young Iranians, all partisans of the then president Khatami, had demonstrated 
for more freedom. They were arrested, beaten up and judged by the revolutionary council. Their 
“friendly” but powerless president could not help them.
While Tehran applauded the fall of the pro-Western governments of Tunisia and Egypt and wanted 
to demonstrate solidarity with the revolutionaries, they remain silent about the bloodshed in Syria, 
which is their closest Arab ally. Apparently, there are not only the pro-Western governments, which 
lack legitimacy in the eyes of their peoples.
The Iranian dimension is watched more attentively in Bahrain where all opposition movements 
were brutally stopped by Saudi forces in mid-March. A Shiite majority, who are ethnic Arabs, 
populates the Gulf emirate of Bahrain.28 The demands by the protesters on Pearl Square where 
they tried to mount a popular sit-in similar to the Egyptian Tahrir (Liberation) Square rather 
quickly moved from a “constitutional monarchy” to eliminating the autocratically ruling family 
al-Khalifa. The Saudi armed forces, mostly mercenaries, invaded Bahrain backed by a mandate 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council. What followed was a dreadful series of arrests, including of 
medical staﬀ  treating wounded demonstrators inside the hospitals. The Saudi media speaks of the 
“Iranians” and not the Shiites in Bahrain, denouncing the protesters as a sort of fi fth column.
Revolutionary Iran with its deplorable record of human rights violations has lost all appeal. Another 
non-Arab country is often quoted as possible model: Turkey torn apart between its secular and 
Islamist layers of society. Though Turkey, governed by the Islamist party of Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan since 2002, has turned into a regional actor with a vibrant economy called the 
“China of Europe”, its potential role as model for transformation in the Arab world is overestimated. 
The legacy of the Ottoman Empire is still present among Arabs today; the mutual mistrust of each 
other can be resented among all layers of society. Though the Turkish government of the Islamist 
party AKP has been championed in the Arab public opinion because of Ankara’s new very critical 
stance towards Israel, the Turkish diplomacy of “zero problems with neighbours” has reached its 
limits. Neither could Turkish mediation in Libya mid-March 2011 pre-empt a military strike initiated 
by French and British air force. Nor did Ankara prove to dispose of a real leverage on Damascus. 
Turkey’s commercial engagement in Libya actually shows that it acted along the same lines as 
Westerners did, doing business with a corrupt and violent regime. If Egypt manages to consolidate 
its post-revolutionary political agenda, if the economic situation – against all odds of the global 
economy – improves and if social cohesion increases, then Egypt might be able for a comeback as 
a diplomatic giant of the region. Such a development would certainly weaken the accomplishments 
of Turkey as the current pivotal actor in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, Turkey can still 
contribute to a new dynamic in the region given its fairly impressive economic evolution and its 
role as investor.
28 That island had belonged to Persia at different intervals of its turbulent history because of its geostrategic po-
sition. Iran’s parliament passed a bill in November 1957 declaring Bahrain the 14th province of Iran, with two 
empty seats allocated for its representatives. One can ironically call that island state as “Iran’s Kuwait” thereby 
alluding to the territorial claims by Baghdad in 1990 considering the city-state Kuwait as its 19th province. In 
1965 Britain began dialogue with Iran to determine their borders in the Persian Gulf. The two were not able to 
determine the maritime borders between the northern and southern countries of the Persian Gulf.
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In order to draw a more complete picture of the many driving forces that have triggered oﬀ  the 
uprising of millions of discontent Arabs against their establishment one should also look into 
another important aspect of general frustration (ihtaj). A woman and a man can only meet for a 
date in public once the respective families have fi xed their wedding day. It is fi rst and foremost up 
to the man to pay for the expensive wedding party and to provide an apartment. To fi nd adequate 
employment and a decent salary has proved more and more diﬃ  cult in the past decades. A 
university certifi cate was never a guarantee. Many men are condemned to remaining bachelors for 
simple economic reasons. But given the many taboos on extra-marital sexuality men and women 
encounter numerous frustrations. That very momentum might have served as an additional factor 
in the mobilisation of the young male population who actually started the demonstrations.
Several background articles in western media have been pointing out the role of the US-author 
Gene Sharp, whose book “From Dictatorship to Democracy”29 may have inspired many of the 
protagonists in the protests. His central message is that the power of dictatorships comes from 
the willing obedience of the people they govern - and that in the case the people can develop 
techniques of withholding their consent, a regime will crumble. 
History might tell us one day if certain networks of non-governmental organisations sponsored by 
Embassies also had a hand in the movements. Personally, I do doubt it profoundly. In contrast to the 
color-revolutions of Ukraine, Serbia or Georgia, the uprisings in North-Africa were all home-made. 
Nevertheless, certain autocrats like Bashar al-Assad, in the tradition of his father, see a conspiracy 
by foreigners and do not accept the national feature of the revolution. Actually, the Syrian opposition 
initially did not attack the president but ask for reforms and expressed their support for him.
How to defi ne these events? Where to categorise them historically? That will be the topic of the 
next sub-chapter.
2.2. Which historic references may serve for a comparative analysis?
2011 could turn into the 1989 for the Arab world – along those lines editorialists made their 
comparisons.30 The reference 1989 is useful in some regards: we see the domino eﬀ ect of changes, 
the spill-over of democratic movements, the risk of civil war and the enormous courage of civilians 
to challenge their rulers by peaceful means. In many respects, it reminds us of the pictures of the 
Polish wharf workers in 1982, of the Tuesday marches by the opposition in Eastern Germany and 
the bloody events in Romania in 1989.
However, in contrast to events between 1989 and 1991 we do not see today a military bloc implode.31 
There is no Soviet-Union and its satellites that make up a solid power-bloc. The revolutionary 
essence is the emancipation of humiliated subjects who have lost their fear and are determined to 
become genuine citizens. 
The revolutions of March 1848 might serve as useful reference, for those events initiated a new 
chapter, namely the beginning of the end of feudal structures in Europe. Started by students, many 
layers of society quickly joined. Peasants fought for their liberation from serfdom to the same 
29 Sharp, Gene. 2010 [1993]. From Dictatorship to Democracy – A Conceptual Framework for Liberation. East 
Boston: Albert Einstein Institute.
30 The author also wrote a comment in that sense for the Austrian weekly magazine Format, edition of February 
2, 2011, p. 15.
31 Comment by Prof. Andre Gingrich on March 2, 2011.
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extent as the workers of the slums of the early industrial age went into the streets. A revolutionary 
wave began in France in February, and immediately spread to most of Europe and parts of Latin 
America. Over 50 countries were aﬀ ected, but there was no coordination among revolutionaries. 
The political demands by the middle-class focussed on constitutionalism to constrain the absolutist 
monarchs.32 Several drafts for constitutions were written, but later abandoned. Peasants and 
workers asked for basic rights, such as the right to marry without consent of the land-owner. 
Liberalism and nationalism were strongly intertwined. In Frankfurt, the German National Council 
met for a year long session. This rise of German nationhood threatened the Habsburg court in 
Vienna, where chancellor Clemens Metternich still fought for a multinational monarchy. The 
uprisings in the Italian regions were also driven by the dream of Italian national unity. In 1830, 
similar revolts had already started, but were quickly suppressed. Metternich miscalculated 1848, 
for the uprising was much more comprehensive than the earlier one.33 A nice anecdote of March 
1848 may be recalled: Emperor Franz Ferdinand who was considered a weak ruler watched the 
riots in front of the Hofburg and asked a member of his cabinet, whether that was a revolt. The 
response was: Your Majesty, no this is a revolution! The monarch shook his head in disbelief 
and made the allegedly famous statement: ”Ja derfens den des” (Are they allowed to do so?). 
Remembering the surprise and shock in the faces of the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents one can 
use that anecdote, for they were not aware of the strength of a revolution. They may have also asked 
themselves: Who allowed the demonstrators to do what they did?
Even though Neo-absolutism gained the upper hand and destroyed many of the reforms, the essence 
of the revolutionary demands survived. And in 1867, the fi rst comprehensive legislation of civil 
rights was passed. That constitutional human rights catalogue is still valid in Austria. We might 
see the return of autocratic régimes in many Arab countries, a rising role of the armies which 
currently assure the interim governments in Tunisia and Egypt. But the demands for political 
change will persist. And it will not take 20 years as was the case in Europe.
The role of the army deserves further investigation for it was decisive in the outcome of the 
uprisings. While the chief-of-staﬀ  oﬃ  cers in Tunisia and Egypt, trained and equipped by Western 
governments, quickly sided with the demonstrators and abandoned the presidents, the actual 
supreme commanders, the situation in Libya and Syria is diﬀ erent. The Libyan army was always 
weak and small. Real power is held by private armies, controlled by various sons of the Ghaddafi  
family. Muammar al Ghaddafi  had maybe prepared for the eventuality of a military uprising and 
had organised numerous units of well-paid mercenaries, mostly from neighbouring subsaharan 
African countries. These men as well as loyal tribes continue to form the main pillar for the 
regime. Urban societies such as in Tunisia and Egypt with a certain tradition of a middle class 
establishment diﬀ er from tribally organised societies like in Libya or in the Gulf states. The risk 
of a continuous civil war in Libya is highly due to the split among loyal and opposing tribes. The 
military intervention on the basis of a UN-Security Council mandate in late March 2011 has only 
increased a long military and political stalemate. How to organise a post-war Libya will be much 
more challenging than in Egypt, where the limbo situation is also very volatile.
32 Evans, R.J.W. and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (eds.). 2000. The Revolutions in Europe 1848-49: From 
Reform to Reaction. New York: Oxford University Press.
33 von Srbik, Heinricht Ritter. 1979 [1925]. Metternich – Der Staatsmann und der Mensch (vol. 1–3). Graz: Aka-
demische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, vol. 3: 312.
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Looking at the army in Syria, we see a command structure loyal to the Assad régime due to ethnic 
aﬃ  liations. The Alawite minority which comprises ca. 15 percent of the Syrian population runs 
all major bodies of the country, comprising security and business. As of April rumours about 
deserting Sunni soldiers who rejected to shoot civilians were known. Most probably mass-killings 
of those combattants by their oﬃ  cers happened. Testimonies by eye-witnesses confi rm this.34 A 
foreign intervention in the guise of the military operation in Libya is to be excluded for Syria. 
The risk of a civil war along confessional lines is even worse given the ethnically fragmented 
population. Furthermore, Syria’s oil and gas reserves are not to be compared to those of Libya and 
Iraq. The ressource issue was important for both those interventions.
The Egyptian army, which has been an integral part of the Egyptian ruling hierarchy since the 
oﬃ  cers’ coup led by Gamal Abdel Nasser in July 1952, quickly assured the interim governement 
with the support of the revolutionary groups. The army even adopted facebook as a means of 
communicating its bulletins or tentative polls of possible presidential candidates. It is not to be 
excluded that the army will stay in power longer than initially planned.
2.3. Who’s next?
The riots quickly spread in late February across the entire Arab world. Even Sudan and Saudi 
Arabia saw Friday demonstrations. The Gulf States, which dispose of massive infl ux of money 
thanks to high oil-prices pushed up even further because of war in Libya, reacted with populist 
economic measures. King Abdullah who returned only in March from the USA, where he had 
been hospitalised for fi ve months, quickly reacted to the new situation by promising “panes et 
circences” to the dissatisfi ed. The renovation of all mosques, increase of salaries and new housing 
were on the list of the Saudi king. 
On the level of regional security we can observe the strengthening of a conservative Sunni 
monarchies’ axis, with the Gulf Cooperation Council as its centre. They invited even the far away 
Maghreb kingdom of Morocco to join their regional organisation GCC. New mercenary forces 
have been recruited by all the Gulf States in order to quell any riot. The Gulf armies primarily 
rely on paid mercenaries rather than on national drafting. The infl ux of Pakistani fi ghters into the 
ranks of the Saudi security forces has apparently increased disproportionally. According to some 
US-analysts, Saudi Arabia pursues a strategy, which is out of touch with regional sentiment. The 
readiness to increase oil-production might be part of this tactic to damage Iran, which cannot go 
beyond its current quota. That scheme may produce some tactical victories for the Kingdom. But, 
if continued over time, a strategy at odds with regional opinion will slowly but surely diminish 
the Kingdom’s ability to win others to its side.35 The strong fi nancial Saudi support of Salafi st 
movements in Egypt can turn into an extremely dangerous game; it is all about obstructing the 
secular character of the revolution. Each country, each society deserves its proper analysis. 
To the same extent as European movements, such as the „Los indignados“ initiative in Spain have 
been inspired by the events in North-Africa, the revolutionary wave might continue to spread 
further. Commodity rich countries in Central Asia, where authoritarian long-term rulers are also 
opposed by a young impatient generation, can be aﬀ ected. The nervousness of authorities in the 
People’s Republic of China is omnipresent in the country. The silent walks were immediately 
34 See Al-Jazeera and other media reports as of early May 2011.
35 http://www.raceforiran.com/oil-and-the-iranian-saudi-“cold-war” visited on July 16, 2011 at 10:30 am.
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forbidden; mass arrests in the aftermath of the fi rst intriguing blogs on the Arab spring highlight 
this atmosphere. In mid-May events in the Mongolian provinces resulted in clashes between Han 
Chinese and ethnic Mongolians trying to save pastureland for their animals from coal exploitation. 
Beijing has orchestrated a complete clampdown on all civil unrest. It remains to be seen whether this 
policy is sustainable given the rising economic importance of China and the political emancipation 
of a self-confi dent middle class. The Arab spring has changed geopolitics on a larger scale.
3. Reactions by the West
“There is no such thing as society”, is probably the most famous quote by former British Prime 
Minister Margret Thatcher.36 The governments in the UK and US of Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
are considered the beginning of deregulation and neoliberalism. Governments were on the retreat, 
markets on the rise both in the industrialised and developing world. As of the late 1990s the term 
“emerging markets” captured investors’ minds. North-African countries are among those markets.
3.1. Not only emerging markets, but societies
Emerging markets promise rapid growth and quick profi ts but also risks. Magazines applauded 
tycoons like the Egyptian constructor Ahmed Ezz and many others well connected with 
government, who are now in jail.37 What had happened in Tunisia and Egypt was the return of 
society, even though a highly fragmented one without any clear leadership. Regime-change came 
as a shock not only to politicians but also the business community. Society seems to be back and it 
can disturb business interests. Commercial sections of Western embassies promoted investments 
in those markets in spite of all visible unrest until the very last moment.
Western governments were taken by surprise in January 2011 when riots started in Tunisia. The 
French Minister for Foreign Aﬀ airs oﬀ ered anti-riot police contingents to crush the protests; 
French politicians had passed their winter holidays at the expenses of Ben Ali and Mubarak. 
Many Western governments did not know how to comment the developments. An embarrassing 
silence revealed the limits of a foreign policy based on alliances with dictators who had guaranteed 
stability at a high price.
Given the on-going bloodshed in Libya, Syria, Yemen and the vacuum in Tunisia and Egypt it is 
impossible to do guesswork on the future of existing contracts. Not only Western governments lost 
money and employment in Libya. China had to evacuate more than 40.000 workers; Turkey had to 
rescue only 8.000 citizens active in contracts worth 18 billion US-Dollar. Certain companies, in 
particular in the oil and gas exploration sector, will have to renegotiate their treaties. The criteria 
for those amendments depend on the ultimate outcome of the revolutions and interventions.
While the West, in particular Europe, was hesitant to act in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, their 
action was prompt with regard to Libya. A coordinated Franco-British initiative implemented UN-
Security Council 1973 on March 19 by attacking Libyan targets in order to pre-empt a potential 
attack by the Gadhafi  forces on Benghazi. The US rejected a lead role given its military and fi nancial 
overstretch. Despite all weakening of the regime, Gadhafi  is still in power, negotiations will have to 
be conducted with him. Unrest among military circles because of limits of ammunition and forces 
causes frictions. The nature of the Libyan opposition is unclear; still the European Union decided 
36 Prime minister Margaret Thatcher, talking to Women’s Own magazine, October 31, 1987. 
37 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-rise-and-fall-of-egypts-most-despised-billionaire-ahmed-ezz/ 
2011/03/29/AFVgNG9C_story.html, visited on April 9, 8 pm.
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to establish a liaison oﬃ  ce in Benghazi in mid-May in order to promote the transitional phase. The 
risk of a secession of Libya is possible. The no-fl y zone strangely follows the historical borders 
of the Cyrenaica. Still not all tribes have abandoned Gadhafi . In his speech on February 22, he 
predicted civil war and a Somalisation of the country, namely a complete implosion of the state.
3.2. The diﬃ  cult economic situation and looming humanitarian tragedies
Though the revolutions in the beginning did not focus exclusively on economic misery, as had been 
the case in earlier bread-revolts, the impoverishment of the people will turn into an increasingly 
burning issue. Food prices are now at an all time high, and are trending higher, indicating that this 
may be only the beginning of the food riot problem. Outbursts ignite concern that the world is due for 
a repeat of the 2008 food protests that rocked countries as far apart as Haiti, Senegal and Bangladesh.
China and India, like much of emerging Asia, are grappling with an escalating infl ation problem. 
Rising food costs, which disproportionately hit the lower to middle income Chinese and Indian 
consumers, can result in a socio-political turmoil. Looking back, bad harvests preceded revolutions 
throughout history. 1789 and 1848 were partially triggered oﬀ  both by hunger and political dissatis-
faction.
The Arab revolts arrive at a complex moment; the overall state of world economy will determine 
the further evolution of post-revolutionary states. Egypt has to import 80 per cent of its basic food, 
such as wheat, rice etc. Given the possible further increase in food prices, more subsidies are 
needed. The economic outlook for the country is gloomy, the tourism sector, a main income in 
foreign currency, is completely paralysed; US-subsidies might be reduced in the wake of a rising 
US-defi cit and a potential shift of Egyptian foreign policy. 
With all due consideration for the socio-economic dimension of the protest, it would be wrong 
to speak of mere revolts because of high food-prices. The Jordanian government perceives the 
uprising by its discontent populations as a bread-revolt. This diagnosis is wrong, and the therapy of 
populist and short-term direct payments to the consumers and civil servants will not result in social 
peace. In addition to the refugee drama in Northern Africa, which aﬀ ects countries in turmoil like 
Tunisia much more than the EU, we might watch soon an even bigger tragedy, which is currently 
growing in the Horn of Africa. 
4. Conclusion: Promises and Pitfalls
There are times of collective suﬀ ering and times of collective rejoicing. Digitally driven leaderless 
revolutions have potential to generate chaos. Turbulences do still lie ahead. We see that in the 
contested preparations of election, in the debate on new constitutions and above all in the on going 
violence in North Africa and the Middle East. Whether the Arab spring will open up a new chapter 
for the region and its peoples is uncertain.
The “Animal Farm” by George Orwell tells the rise and fall of a revolution of the animals against 
their farmer and the usurpation by the pigs, the conclusions could be: the Arab revolutions might 
fail as had done before the Russian revolution, the Iranian revolution and many others. 
But on the other hand, history is also full of good surprises. The Arab revolutions tell an impressive 
story about the human will and how to overcome fear. The Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai 
refrained from commenting the consequences of the French Revolution by saying that “It is too 
early to tell”. We are in no position to interpret the ultimate outcome of today’s history in the 
making.
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Map of the Arab spring movements
To date, there have been revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt; a civil war in Libya; civil uprisings in 
Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen; major protests in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman; and minor 
protests in Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan.
      = Revolutions           = Civil war          = Sustained civil disorder and governmental changes 
      = Protests and governmental changes            = Major protests            = Minor protests
Source: http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/File:Arab_Spring_map.png#fi lelinksDerivative work of
File:BlankMap-World-large2.png. A map of protests in the “Arab world” as part of the “Arab Spring”.
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